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Off the Deep End: Tonga’s 




Tonga had gone off the deep end.  It proposed to grow its 
ocean territory in length by 60 nautical miles southeast and 
southwest.  Hardly anyone knew the particulars, apart from a 
select group of senior bureaucrats in the Government of Tonga 
persevering to make it happen.  The Tongan public paid closer 
attention to who might come into government at the November 
2014 election and whether any women would get voted into 
parliament. 
Local media had spoon fed this slant to the masses which 
uncritically they consumed as the top news feed.  
Alternatively, raising awareness about continental shelf 
politics failed to appear on the public information menu.  Why 
should it matter to ordinary Joe Blog Tongan scratching out a 
living in a distressed economy? 
The story unfolds that Lord Ma’afu, the Minister for Lands, 
Environment, Climate Change, and Natural Resources entered 
office after the first partial submission on the outer limits of 
Tonga’s continental shelf had been prepared.  His predecessor 
Lord Tuita tabled the document for consideration at the United 
Nations in April of 2010.   
Ma’afu was tasked with overseeing a second partial 
submission to acquire 60 nautical miles in the Lau-Colville 
Ridge, which he delivered to the United Nations headquarters 
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in New York on April 23rd 2014.  It would be weighed up the 
following year in 2015 (United Nations, 2014). 
This essay prods two pressure points.  Firstly, how did 
securing Tonga’s continental shelf further than the 200 mile 
exclusive economic zone relate to deep sea mining?  And 
secondly, what prompted Fiji’s 2005 objection to the 
International Seabed Authority about Tonga’s sovereign 
declaration over the Minerva Reefs?  In the current geopolitical 




What’s in a shelf? 
 
Mr Tuita pointed out that the submission was a partial 
submission in respect of the eastern part of the 
Kermadec Ridge and that it was without prejudice to a 
second submission in respect of any potential 
continental shelf spaces extended beyond 200 nautical 
miles in the western part of the Lau Ridge, which would 
be made at a later stage. (Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, 2010, pp. 12-13). 
 
On May the 11th 2009 the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations acknowledged “receipt of the submission made by 
Tonga to the Commission on the limits of the continental 
shelf” (United Nations, 2009).  Tonga barely made the deadline 
for submissions, scraping in by two days (Schofield, 2010, p. 
164).  Almost a year later at the twenty-fifth session of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) held 
at the United Nations headquarters from March 15th to April 
23rd 2010, Lord Tuita presented Tonga’s partial submission 
for consideration.  He was accompanied by the solicitor 
general ‘Aminiasi Kefu, government’s principal geologist Kelepi 
Off the Deep End 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
175 
Mafi, Tonga’s permanent representative to the United Nations 
Sonatane Taumoepeau-Tupou, “and a number of advisors” 
(Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2010, p. 
12).  For a poor country, the Tongan state spared no expense 
on travelling in a crowd from Nuku’alofa to New York. 
It could be read in Tuita’s speech that Tonga had faced 
similar challenges to that of other Pacific Island states.  
“Struggling to meet the 13 May 2009 deadline” with a half-
done paper that was not the complete picture of ocean sites 
Tonga wanted to go after, the Tongan minister politely nodded 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) who had a “huge workload and backlog of submissions 
to examine” (Schofield, 2010, p. 164; Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2010, pp. 12-13).  The 
question was how might a “huge workload and backlog” affect 
the quality of the process in fairly assessing a mountain of 
submissions, partial submissions, and “sets of preliminary 
information” by a scheduled time frame? (Schofield, 2010, p. 
164).  For Pacific Island states such as Tonga, how did the 
scarcity of technical expertise and financial backing impact on 
a developing country’s capacity to prepare a submission under 
time constraints? 
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Lord Ma’afu (right) hands Tonga’s second partial 
submission on the outer limits of the continental shelf to 
Miguel de Serpa Soares (left), the United Nations Under-
Secretary-General for legal affairs and United Nations 
legal counsel at the New York headquarters.  Photograph: 
Government of Tonga, 23 April 2014. 
 
During that year from May 2009 to April 2010, Tonga 
focused on the minister’s United Nations presentation on 
obtaining a south-eastern continental shelf outside of the 
country’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 
the Kermadec Ridge.  The ocean zone they were after 
overlapped with New Zealand’s continental shelf.  But Tuita 
wanted his country’s “partial submission” taken into account 
because New Zealand “had raised no objection to the 
Commission considering and making recommendations” on 
Tonga’s claim. 
Noting that “a second submission” was coming at a later 
date which the minister did not specify, Tonga also intended to 
go for continental shelf space past its south-western EEZ in 
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the Lau-Colville Ridge (Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, 2010, pp. 12-13).  As maritime territory Fiji 
had set its sights on for their continental shelf, would the Lau-
Colville Ridge exacerbate discord with the Fijian government 
who prior to this, had opposed Tonga’s proclamation over the 
Minerva Reefs? 
In December of 2010 Lord Ma’afu got the job of Tonga’s 
Minister for Lands, Environment, Climate Change, and 
Natural Resources in the Tu’ivakano government (Brown Pulu, 
2012, 2013b).  With the territory came responsibility for 
managing a second partial submission added to the one Lord 
Tuita put in.  Tonga’s outer continental shelf contention in the 
Lau-Colville Ridge complemented its first one in the Kermadec 
Ridge. 
At the New York headquarters on April 23rd 2014 Ma’afu 
delivered in person the second partial submission, which took 
five years to compile, to Miguel de Serpa Soares, the United 
Nations under-general-secretary for legal affairs and United 
Nations legal counsel.  The Tongan state now awaited their 
proposal’s deliberation at the thirty-seventh session of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, where the 
date would be set for New York in either January or February 
of 2015 (United Nations, 2014; Government of Tonga, 2014). 
 
On 23 April 2014, the Kingdom of Tonga submitted 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured in the western 
part of the Lau-Colville Ridge. (Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2014). 
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Theoretically, the minister who followed Ma’afu after the 
November 2014 election would see the second partial 
submission to its 2015 reading at the United Nations.  Tonga’s 
continental shelf claims looked to stretch across triplicate 
ministers from three separate governments dissimilar in their 
tactics on foreign diplomacy.  Different to the former Sevele 
administration, under the present Tu’ivakano government 
Tongan diplomacy and international relations had spiralled 
downward with New Zealand and Australia expressly.  To 
these traditional Western aid donors, the Tongan prime 
minister’s single-mindedness on China and Asia relations 
coupled with his interpersonal communication as the head of 
foreign affairs came across offhand, brusque, and 
unsophisticated. 
Plausibly the New Zealand and Australian governments 
cultivated and conveyed a certain political scepticism about 
Tonga’s bilateral relations with China which could be said, had 
more to do with clutching on to their trade and aid donor 
primacy over South Pacific states.  The fact was these Western 
states and Pacific Rim neighbours were home to sizeable 
Tongan populations.  Overseas Tongans were large-scale 
remitters of wealth to the homeland state and felt baffled and 
betrayed that Tonga had forfeited traditional relationships with 
New Zealand and Australia in favour of attending to China as 
their main affair (Hill, 2014). 
In terms of continental shelf politics, Tonga had to comply 
as scrupulously as a government could with the procedure for 
satisfying the legal obligations set out in article 76 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United 
Nations, 1982; Persand, 2005).  Confined to an extensive 
process of partial submissions, overlapping borders, and 
country-to-country intercessions on delimiting boundaries, the 
last remaining Kingdom in the South Pacific was dead serious 
about getting hold of sea zones beyond its EEZ’s south-eastern 
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and south-western maritime borders (Prescott and Boyes, 
2000). 
In non-legalistic language why was getting Tonga’s 
continental shelf recognised under international law vital to 
national security and geopolitical interests?  Or was this more 
an official state line of indoctrination?  By this, the raw motive 
behind extending the country’s ocean domain was the allure of 
finding deep sea minerals to accelerate economic growth.  
Compounding this was that the United Nations formula which 
countries used to configure continental shelf submissions did 
not necessarily iron out the complexity that maritime claims 
by Pacific Island states overlapped.  Therefore, delimiting 
boundaries got tangled in ongoing debates about where one 
territory stopped and another started. 
Clive Schofield, director of research at the Australian 
national centre for ocean resources and national security at 
the University of Wollongong made it clear that the “majority of 
the potential maritime boundaries that exist in the Pacific 
Islands region have yet to be delimited” (Schofield, 2010, p. 
157).  He referred expressly to the situation of Pacific Island 
states where a rush to make United Nations submissions on 
the continental shelf before the May 13th 2009 cut-off date 
had meant that firstly, there was a plethora of “outer” or 
“extended” ocean borders on the waiting list for rubber stamp 
approval. 
Secondly, many intersected into each other creating 
overlapping “maritime boundaries” and new perimeters 
redrawing the Pacific Ocean map.  And thirdly, these “potential 
maritime boundaries” had not been delimited by the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982). 
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The situation has in recent times been exacerbated 
as a consequence of States from the region making 
submissions regarding the outer limits of their 
continental shelf rights extending beyond 200nm 
[nautical miles] from their coasts.  As a number of the 
areas of the ‘outer’ or ‘extended’ continental shelf 
subject to these submissions overlap with one another, 
additional potential maritime boundaries have come 
into existence that have also yet to be delimited. 
(Schofield, 2010, p. 157).  
 
How exactly was the United Nations blueprint for setting 
definite limits, dimensions, and boundaries on new ocean 
territories of Pacific Island states going to work in light that 
these very borders were overlain and contested between 
countries?  In short, who knows?  
The second decade of the 21st century saw Pacific Islander 
academics echo and evoke ‘Epeli Hau’ofa’s romantic notion 
that the Pacific region’s small island developing states 
cohabited a borderless ocean that knew no bounds (Hau’ofa, 
2008).  This was not true.  The open ocean known as 
international waters could be legislated like land under a 
United Nations convention with explicit delimitations 
measuring sea areas claimed individually by countries who 
were not about sea sharing.  On the contrary, the Pacific 
Islands were big ocean states that were about getting their 
piece of the deep sea pie. 
Subsequently, an over idealised sentiment that Pacific 
governments had bonded together on climate adaptation to 
adverse weather and living conditions as their collective 
development priority was ambiguous.  If that truly was the 
case, then why had delimiting ocean domains belonging to 
independent sovereign states become the most important and 
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understated political and economic activity of the current 
times? (Schofield, 2010). 
Adding 60 nautical miles to Tonga’s 200 mile exclusive 
economic zone was laced to strengthening international rights 
as a sponsoring state of deep sea companies to explore the 
high seas and seek out mineral wealth (Brown Pulu, 2013a).  
In saying this, a head-on collision between climate adaptation 
that promoted environmental conservation and continental 
shelf politics in pursuit of territorial expansion for natural 
resources was not escapable but rather, fated. 
 
 
It is all about deep sea minerals 
Cleo Paskal and Michael Lodge co-authored a briefing paper 
for Chatham House, a London based institute on international 
affairs called A Fair Deal on International Wealth (Paskal and 
Lodge, 2009).  The timeliness of the Paskal and Lodge’s 
publication in February of 2009 was purposeful.  It came out 
three months before member states to the United Nations who 
“ratified the Convention [on the Law of the Sea] before 13 May 
1999 [had] until 13 May 2009 to” put in their continental shelf 
submissions (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 2). 
Succinctly the co-authors encapsulated the “sudden 
interest in the OCS [outer continental shelf]” (Paskal and 
Lodge, 2009, p. 2).  For the majority of claimants who were 
poor countries, interest was driven by potential geopolitical 
and economic security; the latter – economic – cultivating 
expectations that extending state borders beyond the 200 
nautical mile EEZ would lead to “underwater resources,” 
namely minerals (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 2). 
 
The is a sudden interest in the OCS [outer 
continental shelf] as States that ratified the Convention 
[on the Law of the Sea] before 13 May 1999 have only 
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until 13 May 2009 to submit that claim.  For many 
developing nations, the added seabed could be 
economically critical.  Land-poor countries such as 
Barbados, Tonga and Palau are hoping to secure their 
financial future with underwater resources.  Only 
fifteen of the States that are estimated to have a 
potential OCS claim do not have developing-country 
status. (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 2). 
 
For Pacific Island states, however, there were two 
unknown political considerations which outer continental 
shelf submissions overlooked because the prospect of 
acquiring an enlarged territory of sea riches outweighed 
precautions to put the brakes on and tread carefully.  
Foremost, Paskal and Lodge noted there was climate change.  
If “sea-level rise” sunk low-lying atoll states below the water 
line, as was the predicament facing Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the 
Marshall Islands, then how could these small island 
developing states call themselves a state or even claim a 
continental shelf without a land-base? (Paskal and Lodge, 
2009, p. 7). 
 
In the most extreme case, an entire nation could be 
submerged by sea-level rise, which could potentially 
extinguish its entire claim (and even statehood), and 
would certainly affect Article 82 implementation in the 
affected areas. (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 7). 
 
Related to this was the bureaucratic red-tape of article 82 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
promising “a portion of the revenue from the extraction of non-
living resources on the OCS [outer continental shelf] must be 
disbursed ‘on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking 
into account the interests and needs of developing States, 
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particularly the least developed and the land-locked among 
them’ (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 1). 
If article 76 of the United Nations convention was the gate 
Pacific Island states had to pass through for outer continental 
shelf authorisation, then article 82 was the next hurdle poor 
countries were forced to jump for an “equitable” share of the 
illusive gold at the bottom of the ocean (Paskal and Lodge, 
2009, p. 1). 
 
However, this article [82] is a complex provision.  It 
is also the only provision in the Convention setting out 
an international royalty concerning an activity within 
national jurisdiction.  It contains a rough and untested 
formula to determine payments or contributions.  The 
uniqueness and complexity of Article 82 demand 
careful consideration of the obligation, principles criteria 
for distribution of benefits, procedural aspects, the role 
of the [International Seabed] Authority, the role of the 
OCS [outer continental shelf] States, and economic and 
temporal issues. (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 3). 
 
Paskal and Lodge observed that article 82 might have 
contained a certain “uniqueness” in laying down “an 
international royalty” regime on mineral “payments,” but it 
was also riddled with “complexity,” particularly when it came 
to defining the legal “obligation” of states in sponsoring seabed 
mining companies (Paskal and Lodge, 2009, p. 3). 
On February 1st of 2011 the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
which was the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
based in Hamburg, Germany, issued a detailed seventy-six 
page advisory opinion.  The chamber was responding to a 
request made almost a year earlier by the Council of the 
International Seabed Authority on 11 May 2010. 
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Two years prior at the council annual meeting on May 
30th 2008, the seabed authority had “deferred action on the 
applications for approval of plans of work for exploration by 
Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. and Tonga Offshore Minerals 
Ltd., sponsored respectively, by the Governments of the 
Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga” (International 
Seabed Authority, 2008a, p. 1).  With direct reference to Nauru 
and Tonga, the council first sought legal clarification on what 
the “responsibilities and obligations” of states were when 
sponsoring seabed mining companies (Seabed Disputes 
Chamber, 2011, p. 6). 
Signalling to Nauru and Tonga whose applications to the 
International Seabed Authority to sponsor subsidiaries of 
Nautilus Minerals Incorporated were pending council decision, 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber made a ruling on state liability 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982). (International Seabed Authority, 2008a, 2008b).  In a 
nutshell the chamber stated that “responsibilities and liability 
of the sponsoring State apply equally to all sponsoring States, 
whether developing or developed” (Seabed Disputes Chamber, 
2011, p. 48).   
Concisely this meant there were no reduced provisions 
under international law for Tonga and Pacific Island states 
because they were developing countries.  The Tongan state 
was under legal obligation to get a seabed minerals bill 
through the legislature quick smart and instated into national 
law.   
As a sponsoring state it was liable for mining damage 
caused to the ocean floor on the same level of culpability as 
developed countries.  If Tonga did not have sufficient 
legislation in which it could follow due diligence it risked 
liability and was in breach of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982). 
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158. It may therefore be concluded that the general 
provisions concerning the responsibilities and liability of 
the sponsoring State apply equally to all sponsoring 
States, whether developing or developed.  159. Equality 
of treatment between developing and developed 
sponsoring States is consistent with the need to prevent 
commercial enterprises based in developed States from 
setting up companies in developing States, acquiring 
their nationality and obtaining their sponsorship in the 
hope of being subjected to less burdensome regulations 
and controls.  The spread of sponsoring States “of 
convenience” would jeopardize uniform application of 
the highest standards of protection on of the marine 
environment, the safe development of activities in the 
Area and protection of the common heritage of 
mankind. (Seabed Disputes Chamber, 2011, p. 48). 
 
Did Tonga have a national law on seabed mineral 
exploration and exploitation?  In brief, no.  Was it likely to get 
one soon?  Again, the short retort was who knows?  There was, 
however, one certainty: the Tongan public were by-and-large 
uninformed, misinformed, and formally cut out of the state 
information loop which threw up a query. 
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at the 
61st session on September 13th 2007 was the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People (United Nations, 2007a).  A 
majority of 144 voting member states out of 192 adopted the 
resolution.  Tonga was counted as one of the thirty-four non-
voting countries alongside most independent Pacific Island 
states, with the exception of Samoa who abstained from voting 
(United Nations, 2013b).  The declaration was not a legally 
binding mechanism according to international law but it did, 
however, indicate what member states generally felt were 
Off the Deep End 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
186 
global standards when it came to a country’s responsibility 
towards protecting indigenous people’s rights. 
On this point Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the 
European Union for foreign affairs and security policy 
observed the “Declaration is a key tool for promoting human 
rights, but the challenge remains in putting it into practice” 
(Ashton, 2013).  If the Tongan government did recognise 
Tongan citizens as indigenous people, which clearly it did not 
as an independent sovereign state that was not formally 
colonised by the British Empire, then adopting the 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
would have given clear guidelines about how to “consult and 
cooperate in good faith” (United Nations, 2007a). 
To illuminate, what governance procedures could Tongans 
use to hold the state to account on gaining citizen consent for 
“any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with development, 
utilization or exploration of mineral, water or other resources?” 
(United Nations, 2007a).  The short answer; there were no 
governance procedures of which the state conscientiously 
informed their public of. 
The terse question; if the Tongan state did not “consult 
and cooperate in good faith” with its citizens on national 
development projects, then how did such disregard for public 
information and benefit controvert international principles 
underpinning the application processes for acquiring a state’s 
outer continental shelf as well as sponsorship of seabed 
mining? (United Nations, 2007a). 
 
Article 32 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith 
with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any 
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project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploration of mineral, water 
or other resources.  3. States shall provide effective 
mechanisms for just and fair redress for any activities, 
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate 
adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or 
spiritual impact. (United Nations, 2007a). 
 
Tonga’s Attorney General Neil Adsett spoke to Matangi 
Tonga, a local media outlet in mid-March of 2013.  He 
predicted that five months down the line in August, his office 
at the Government of Tonga crown law department would have 
a deep sea mining bill into the legislative assembly for its first 
reading.  The bill never arrived in the House. 
To this day, more than a year has passed since Adsett’s 
avowal that the “bill is on our legislative program for 2013” 
(Matangi Tonga, 2013a).  The truth was Tongans were still 
anticipating when this mysterious bill, which had not been 
officially released for public review and submissions, would 
materialise. 
 
The bill is on our legislative program for 2013 so we 
hope it will go to parliament in July or August.  … Sea 
mineral exploration companies need a license to 
prospect, explore or mine, and the environmental issues 
are very strictly guarded and they pay royalties to 
Tonga. (Tonga Attorney General Neil Adsett cited in 
Matangi Tonga, 2013a). 
 
If the Tongan state’s sponsorship of deep sea mining, the 
national legislation required to protect the state from liability, 
and all it encompassed was elusive to citizens, then it was the 
opposite for Paula Taumoepeau.  He headed Tonga Offshore 
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Minerals Limited, the country’s one seabed minerals company 
at work outside the exclusive economic zone which 
monopolised this national industry. 
Critical to figuring out the Tongan government’s 
relationship to Tonga Offshore Minerals Limited as its state 
sponsor of seabed exploration is to realise that the state was in 
the business of privatising national natural resources (Sato, 
2014).  This government policy failed to ask for public opinion 
on denationalising deep sea minerals when calculating the 
costs and benefits to the country.  Given the legal complexity 
and high-risk involved the argument that Tonga stood to lose 
more than gain was graspable. 
Cited in Matangi Tonga, Taumoepeau commented on his 
company’s participation at a regional workshop on deep sea 
minerals hosted in Tonga from 11 – 15 March 2013 which was 
co-organised by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and 
the European Union (Brown Pulu, 2013a).  “We hope the 
industry will continue to be consulted on deep sea minerals,” 
he confided (Matangi Tonga, 2013b). 
Obviously the Tongan government was committed to 
“consult and cooperate in good faith” with its sponsored deep 
sea minerals company on the proposed law governing the 
industry (United Nations, 2007a).  But the question remained 
as to why Tongan citizens were not, for the most part, included 
in the information sharing and consultation procedure as a 
sounding board for gathering public views.   
 
For Nautilus, we had the opportunity to put our 
views forward and updated about our project, as there 
were a lot of misconceptions about what we do.  … One 
workshop would not solve the issues at once, that’s 
why it is important to have ongoing dialogues and we 
hope the industry will continue to be consulted on deep 
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Tonga in a seabed of mining  
By layman’s terms or in simple language, the high seas 
referred to international waters; that is, the open ocean which 
is distant from land and under no particular country’s 
national jurisdiction and territorial control.  January of 2012 
saw Tonga become the second small island developing state 
next to Nauru to make a successful application to the 
International Seabed Authority.  The Government of Tonga 
had obtained approval to be a sponsoring state of deep sea 
mining companies exploring with a mind to exploit, given there 
were sufficient mineral deposits in international waters. 
An agreement reached between the seabed authority and 
the Tongan state gave a Canadian company Nautilus Minerals 
Incorporated exclusive rights to mine a “74,153 km2 [seabed 
located] in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone of the Pacific Ocean,” 
which was a “marine area beyond the limits of [Tonga’s] 
national jurisdiction” (International Seabed Authority, 2012). 
The treasure hunt was for polymetallic or manganese 
nodules that lay four to six thousand metres down on the 
seafloor.  The rock fossils contained financially valuable 
properties of nickel, copper, and cobalt of which Tonga would 
receive royalties from the company’s discoveries. 
Nautilus Minerals Incorporated had formed a subsidiary 
called Tonga Offshore Mining Limited of which Paula 
Taumoepeau, a Tongan national was the country manager.  As 
a prescription under Tongan law the parent company was 
required to register as a business in Tonga.  The Tongan 
branch that was created, however, was still Nautilus Minerals 
Incorporated with a Friendly Islands ring to its name. 
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The International Seabed Authority and Tonga 
Offshore Mining Limited (TOML) today signed a 15-year 
contract for exploration for polymetallic nodules in an 
area covering 74,153 km2 in the Clarion-Clipperton 
Zone of the Pacific Ocean.  This marine area beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction is one of a number of 
reserved areas earmarked for developing countries 
such as the Kingdom of Tonga and was ceded by ISA 
contractors from Germany, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and France. (International Seabed Authority, 
2012). 
 
To obtain a contract for exploring and exploiting the 
seabed at high seas, the Tongan government had to appeal to 
sponsoring states who were current contractors of the 
International Seabed Authority.  They needed their agreement 
to share mining space in international waters.  A selection of 
“ISA contractors from Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and France” conceded to Tonga’s entry into mineral 
exploration of a section of the Pacific Ocean called the Clarion-
Clipperton Fracture Zone. 
“Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and France” were 
already mining this area as state sponsors of commercial 
businesses (International Seabed Authority, 2012).  All up, the 
International Seabed Authority stated it had twelve contracts 
in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone, the clear majority of 
nine going to developed countries with Nauru, Tonga, and 
Kiribati who were soon to sign a contract, making up the three 
developing states (International Seabed Authority, 2014). 
The financial superiority of developed states allowed them 
to be state sponsors for companies from their own countries, 
of which for some governments they held shares in.  In the 
Republic of Korea’s case, the government ran its own company 
(International Seabed Authority, 2012).  By comparison, China 
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and Japan who had two sections of international waters they 
were mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone and the 
Western Pacific Ocean were guarantors for state-owned 
companies. 
Parked on what appeared to be a quickly crowding up 
Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone was also an inter-
governmental company, the Interoceanmetal Joint 
Organization.  Shareholders here were a an association of 
sponsoring states from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, and Slovakia (International 
Seabed Authority, 2014).  Conspicuously this seabed minerals 
alliance was made up of states constituting the former Union 
of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) along with Cuba, which 
continues to be a socialist republic. 
Since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union into the 
Russian Federation and a host of independent sovereign 
states, the economies of the past Eastern European bloc have 
accelerated through gas, oil, and mineral exploitation of 
natural resources within their respective countries.  It is 
noteworthy that the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization was 
set-up to explore deep sea minerals in the northern Pacific 
Ocean which historically lies outside the sphere of influence of 
these European states and Cuba, a Caribbean island state.  
More than that, the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone is 
located in international waters that can be considered part of 
the security and economic interests of the United States of 
America. 
My point is the diplomatic relations between the United 
States and the Russian Federation and Cuba are politically 
volatile.  Even after the end of the 20th century Cold War, 
America’s disparagement of the 2014 succession of the 
Ukrainian state of Crimea to the Russian Federation has 
highlighted United States and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) hostility towards Russia.  Could the 
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Interoceanmetal Joint Organization be interpreted as political 
provocation by America? 
If so, how were small island developing states such as 
Nauru, Tonga, and Kiribati caught in the crossfire of an 
American superpower that assumed the northern Pacific 
Ocean was its strategic domain in respect of newcomers to 
Pacific regional politics and influence such as the Russian 
Federation?  America and its Western allies Australia and New 
Zealand had China’s economic primacy in the Pacific to 
contend with.  Would Russia’s presence in Pacific seabed 
mining tip the scales? 
Yoichiro Sato, a political scientist at Ritsumeikan Asia 
Pacific University authored an opinion piece for the New 
Zealand International Review (Sato, 2014).  Titled Tonga’s risky 
seabed mining ventures, Sato’s paper argued a double-edged 
critique as to why this small island developing state was 
unfavourably positioned legally and financially to manage 
high-risk operations as a sponsoring state of deep sea mining 
multinationals. 
Sato first pointed to “the risks of losses and liabilities” in a 
developing country’s business scheme regulated by 
international law, regulations, and competencies at operating 
by the same standards as developed countries.  Who would 
pay “for the poorly developed governance competency of 
Tonga?” he asked.  The Tongan “taxpayers” was his response 
(Sato, 2014, p. 19). 
 
The Tongan government’s involvement in seabed 
mining in international waters exposes it to the risk of 
losses and liabilities that will have to be shouldered by 
the taxpayers.  For the poorly developed governance 
competency of Tonga, seabed mining simultaneously 
offers too much economic lure and demands too much 
supervisory responsibility. (Sato, 2014, p. 19). 
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Sato then gestured to the “absence of transparent law 
governing the deep-sea mining” industry in Tonga.  Not only 
did the Tongan government have an obligation under 
international law to protect the state from liability, which 
effectively would fall on the “taxpayers,” but there was the 
matter of privatising the country’s natural resources without 
legal precautions for ensuring “a fair return to the government 
coffer” (Sato, 2014, p. 19). 
 
The absence of transparent law governing the deep-
sea mining and the Tongan government’s decision to 
sign international joint exploration and production 
agreements have set the stage for the partial 
privatisation of national resources without a fair return 
to the government coffer. (Sato, 2014, p. 19). 
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Standing left to right: Kairat Sydykov, Christine Utu’atu, 
‘Aminiasi Kefu.  Sitting left to right: Natalia Lapina, Lord 
Ma’afu.  Photograph: Matangi Tonga, 22 February 2012.  
The Matangi Tonga Online photograph and article is 
incorrectly dated.  It should read 31 January 2011. 
 
A large swathe of Tonga’s seabed oil rights have 
been given to an enigmatic Russian [Kairat Sydykov] 
from companies that cannot be traced and to its multi-
millionaire crown princess [Pilolevu Tuita].  The deal 
echoing other Tongan embarrassments – a court jester 
who took off with millions and a Korean religious group 
who duped the government claiming natural gas could 
be extracted from Tongan seawater – was sealed with 
a party serenaded by a voluptuous Russian 
[entertainer, Natalia Lapina] from Las Vegas. (Field, 
2011c).  
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Left to right: Joey Mataele, Natalia Lapina.  Photograph: 
Matangi Tonga, 22 February 2012.  The Matangi Tonga 
Online photograph and article is incorrectly dated.  It 
should read 31 January 2011. 
 
Also there was Tonga’s premier transsexual 
entertainer Joey Mataele and [Russian entertainer from 
Las Vegas] Natalia Lapina, complete with long flowing 
blond hair and a deep cleavage. (Field, 2011c).  
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If deep sea minerals were tricky to find in international 
waters and for the Tongan state to exploit for corpus amounts 
of money, then petroleum mining within Tonga’s exclusive 
economic zone proved slippery.  Most definitely, something 
appeared to be amusingly and derisorily wrong with the 
picture that New Zealand journalist Michael Field painted with 
tongue-in-cheek lavishness.  Perhaps it was the interplay of 
what readers visualised in the Matangi Tonga Online 
photographs featured in an article titled US group celebrates 
new oil exploration agreements with Tonga.  The festivity took 
place at the Dateline Hotel in Nuku’alofa on Friday 28 January 
2011 featuring in a Matangi Tonga Online write-up on Monday 
31 January 2011, although it was incorrectly dated on the 
company’s website as 22 February 2012. 
Tonga’s “who’s who in the zoo” had gathered for a celebrity 
party.1  What exactly called for the carnival atmosphere was 
hazy.  Drawn in was an odd mix of royalty, nobility, cabinet 
ministers, senior government bureaucrats, overseas diplomats, 
and elite business owners; many of whom were distant and 
detached from each other in their profit-making pursuits and 
political views. 
A Russian petroleum prospector took centre stage of the 
high-profile occasion; Dr Kairat Sydykov, whose work history 
included the oil fields of Kazakhstan, a central Asia state with 
the “second largest oil production among the former Soviet 
republics after Russia” (U.S. Energy Information, 2013).  Now, 
Sydykov was part of a transnational corporation located in 
Denver and London called the Modulus-Baringer Group; not 
that any person outside a Russian oil oligarch’s inner-circle 
could confirm this was an accurate profile. 
What was the common ground between the former Prime 
Minister Dr Feleti Sevele and the current Prime Minister Lord 
Tu’ivakano in respect to mining Tonga’s ocean floor for which 
they had prioritised their attendance at this function?  The 
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hotel spectacle reflected to ordinary Tongan folks on the outer 
limits of the top shelf (not to be confused with the continental 
shelf) an assemblage of the nation’s powerhouse; that is, a 
social outing for Tonga’s asset wealthy who characterised the 
privileged few bordering the corrupt and unashamed to flaunt 
it in the faces of poor citizens who lived without, with little, 
and with want. 
In local media, Matangi Tonga reported that the Modulus-
Baringer Group represented by Dr Kairat Sydykov was in town 
to celebrate successful contract negotiations with the Tongan 
government.  The Friday night party saw Sydykov bring in a 
Las Vegas entertainer to sing at the Dateline Hotel called 
Natalia Lapina who was Russian by origin too.  He “had spent 
four days in negotiations” with Tonga’s Minister of Lands Lord 
Ma’afu and a team of senior government officials (Matangi 
Tonga, 2012). 
Out of discussions emerged three petroleum exploration 
contracts for “three Tonga registered companies,” subsidiaries 
of the Modulus-Baringer Group which government press 
releases by the Prime Minister’s Office referred to as the 
Modulus Pacific Company Limited registered in Tonga 
(Matangi Tonga, 2012; Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).  
Presently the Modulus-Baringer Group as a parent company 
had disappeared from cyber space, no longer appearing as a 
corporate website. 
The exploration “agreements” between the Tongan state 
and Modulus-Baringer were transferred by the former Sevele 
administration in office from 2006 to 2010 over to the 
Tu’ivakano regime governing from 2010 to 2014 (Matangi 
Tonga, 2012).  Uttered within government circles was that the 
current prime minister had been unyielding, despite concerns 
raised by senior cabinet ministers as to whether the previous 
arrangements would be unquestionably shouldered by his 
government, that he wanted the settlement signed off.  Why 
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was a review of prior deals not allowed in this case with the 
Tongan premier’s push for signatures? 
 
The Attorney General, ‘Aminiasi Kefu, said that a 
negotiation team including Lord Ma’afu (now Minister of 
Lands), Busby Kautoke Chief Secretary to Cabinet, and 
Kelepi Mafi the government geologist, had spent four 
days in negotiations with the Modulus-Baringer Group, 
which resulted in three petroleum agreements with 
three Tonga registered companies.  He said that the 
former Deputy Prime Minister Dr Tangi had signed the 
agreements last January on behalf of the Tonga 
government, under a 1985 law. (Matangi Tonga, 2012). 
 
“There is corruption in government,” stated Sione Taione 
in parliament on October 16th 2013 (Fonua, 2013).  Taione, 
the people’s representative for Tongatapu constituency 
number 8 did not mix his words, targeting the Prime Minister’s 
Office by his judgement.  Tonga’s legislative assembly was in 
the middle of receiving the 2012 annual report of the Ministry 
of Lands, Environment, Climate Change and Natural 
Resources delivered by the Minister Lord Ma’afu when 
deliberations became wedged.  Who was the Modulus-Baringer 
Group, the oil multinational said to be based in the United 
States and the United Kingdom and led by Dr Kairat Sydykov? 
Long-standing reporter on Tonga’s parliament Pesi Fonua 
disentangled the convoluted story in a Matangi Tonga 
commentary.  In the House, Taione had raised objection with 
two points he interpreted from Lord Ma’afu’s annual report for 
his ministry.  Principally, the company Modulus-Baringer was 
thought to have been “administered and managed by the 
Prime Minister’s Office,” which if it was, presented an outright 
conflict of professional and public interest (Fonua, 2013).  Why 
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would the highest office in the public service be administering 
a private sector oil business? 
Concomitantly, there was princess regent Pilolevu’s link 
“with the company” which Taione figured had to entail 
nepotism at play.  For one, Modulus-Baringer “did not pay any 
license fees.”  But significantly, why did this particular 
company have an “exclusive [petroleum mining right] to the 
whole [EEZ ocean] of Tonga?” (Fonua, 2013).   
 
Most intriguing though, according to the report, 
Modulus is administered and managed by the Prime 
Minister’s Office.  Sione said that Princess Pilolevu was 
affiliated with the company and pointed out a disparity 
in seabed rights favouring the Modulus, a company that 
did not pay any license fees.  According to Sione three 
mineral exploration companies were confined to one 
small area in their seabed exploration for minerals in 
comparison to Modulus, which has the exclusive right to 
the whole of Tonga. (Fonua, 2013). 
 
Dr Sitiveni Halapua, the people’s representative for 
Tongatapu constituency number three entered into the line of 
parliamentary cross-examination, offering suggestions on how 
to get some accountability around the Prime Minister and his 
office.  The lack of fiscal and political accountability for the 
premier, his acting secretary, his advisors, and entire office 
staff put the opposition in continuous discomfort; a type of 
distress that kept sparking up without any parliamentarian 
being able to get to the bottom of it and correct the problem, 
fix a non-transparent system, once and for all. 
 
Dr Sitiveni Halapua, the PR [people’s 
representative] No 3 for Tongatapu, pointed out that 
according to the report Modulus was administered and 
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managed by the PM’s [prime minister’s] Office.  He said 
it was a mystery as to why this was not stated in the 
PM’s Annual Reports despite the fact that it was 
reported in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Land.  
He moved for the administration and management of 
the Modulus to be moved from the PM’s office to the 
Ministry of Land.  He also moved for the annual report 
of the Ministry of Land to be included in reports of 
mineral explorations that have been carried out, and a 
detailed report on all the companies that are exploring 
for mineral, gas and oil on Tonga’s seabed. (Fonua, 
2013). 
 
The prime minister himself was overseas at the time.  On 
returning to Tonga, a statement was issued from his office 
which made the premier’s personal disgruntlement with 
Taione prying into the business of Modulus Pacific Company 
Limited loud and clear. 
 
The Prime Minister’s Office wishes to issue this 
statement in rebuttal of the unfounded and cheap 
allegation of corruption made by Sione Taione People 
Representative for Tongatapu No. 8 against the Prime 
Minister and his Office. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
 
Fired at Sione Taione’s discussion was an opening volley 
arguing that the “management of this company,” was not in 
any way, shape or form under the prime minister’s 
administration (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
 
[Modulus Pacific Company Limited] administers and 
manages its own affairs through its Directors and its 
Management Team.  The Prime Minister’s Office is not 
involved in any way with the management of this 
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company.  The allegation that Modulus Pacific is 
administered and managed by the Prime Minister’s 
Office is totally false (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
 
The governance of Modulus Pacific Company Limited was a 
different story.  An advisory committee ran out of the Prime 
Minister’s Office under the chairmanship of the “Chief 
Secretary and Secretary of Cabinet” had been authorised to 
guide the Minister for Lands Lord Ma’afu on matters 
concerning the company in relation to the Tonga Petroleum 
Mining Act (Revised Edition 1988). (Prime Minister’s Office, 
2013).  Consisting of three senior bureaucrats on behalf of the 
Government of Tonga in collaboration with three company 
delegates from Modulus Pacific Company Limited, the 
committee looked as if to take on a ministerial advice-giving 
role merged into a quasi-governance body. 
 
What Sione Taione did not understand and failed to 
find out is that the advisory Committee consisting of the 
Chief Secretary and Secretary to Cabinet, Deputy 
Secretary in charge of Geology Division of the Ministry 
of Lands, Environment, Climate Change and Natural 
Resources; the Solicitor General and three members 
appointed by Modulus Pacific and its two partner 
subsidiary companies is responsible for advising the 
Minister of Lands in his role as the competent authority.  
The Chairman of the Committee is the Chief Secretary 
and Secretary to Cabinet and the Committee operates 
from the Prime Minister’s Office.  The Minister of Lands, 
Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources, 
is the sole competent authority for all exploration and 
mining of petroleum under the Petroleum Mining Act 
[Revised Edition 1988].  The Minister is supported by 
the Advisory Committee (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
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Modulus Pacific Company Limited of Nuku’alofa, Tonga 
was registered on October 14th 2009, almost five years ago.  
The company directors were recorded since January 11th 
2013 as Lucy ‘Ilaiu and Maria Elliot.  As well, Her Royal 
Highness Princess Salote Mafile’o Pilolevu Tuita was named as 
owning 30 shares in contrast to the majority shareholder 
Tonga Petroleum Corp with 970 shares; although divergent 
accounts held the princess regent as a much larger twenty per 
cent shareholder for each of the “three Tonga registered 
companies” in petroleum mining (Open Corporates, 2013; 
Matangi Tonga, 2012; Field, 2011c; Sato, 2014). 
In the space of five years, how many advisory committee 
meetings were conducted “from the Prime Minister’s Office” 
with the “Chief Secretary and Secretary to Cabinet” as the 
“Chairman of the Committee?” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).  
As the chair, it would be considered procedural for the prime 
minister’s acting chief secretary ‘Aholotu Palu to call regular 
meetings.  Considering the advisory committee consisted of six 
members in which three were state officials exemplifying 
government interests, a fair question would have been to ask 
where the meeting minutes were archived. 
Conspicuously, the people’s representatives did not seem 
to know how to access minutes or request such information in 
the legislature.  In the House, they stopped short of asking if 
parliament’s standing committee on finance and public 
accounts “responsible for all matters pertaining to the 
collection of all public income” monitored licensing fees and 
mining royalties paid by Modulus Pacific Company Limited 
and its two subsidiaries to the Tongan state (Parliament of 
Tonga, 2013). 
If it was indeed factual that the “three Tonga registered 
companies” would commence petroleum exploration in the 
present year of 2014, then what precisely were the terms of 
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agreement on licensing fees and state royalties? (Matangi 
Tonga, 2012).  The business risk was “the government coffer” 
might not have been collecting revenue worth its while from 
petroleum contracts publicised as celebratory, but in reality, 
shadowy and secretive (Sato, 2014, p. 19). 
Significant points of argument raised by Sione Taione in 
the legislature on October 8th 2013 deserve attention here.  
Foremost, a petroleum mining license was issued by the 
reigning monarch in council, not altogether by the Minister 
Lord Ma’afu as the “sole competent authority for all 
exploration and mining of petroleum” of which the prime 
minister’s office had detailed (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). 
Additionally, Taione’s unease about Modulus Pacific 
Company Limited’s exclusive rights to explore for petroleum 
throughout “5.5 per cent of the Tongan EEZ … at 37,000 
square kilometers of marine schedule lands” was not without 
cause.  Under national law, newcomer prospecting companies 
were prohibited from entering the “area of land which [had] 
already been covered by [this] petroleum agreement” (Sato, 
2014, p. 19-20; Tonga Petroleum Mining Act, 1988, p. 8). 
Hypothetically Modulus Pacific Company Limited could, 
given its management satisfied the requirements of “an 
application for the extension” of a petroleum mining license, 
take out “5.5 per cent of the Tongan EEZ” indefinitely (Tonga 
Petroleum Mining Act, 1988, p. 8; Sato, 2014, p. 20).  Precisely 
the length of time in which this particular company would 
continue to mine a large designated area of the country’s 
exclusive economic zone was left wide open to speculation. 
 
His Majesty in Council may issue an exploration 
licence in respect of the whole or any part of the area of 
land applied for, and every exploration licence issued 
under this Act may, subject to the following provisos, 
authorise the licensee thereof to explore for petroleum 
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over the whole or any part of the area of land specified 
in that license: Provided that an exploration license 
shall not be issued in respect of an area of land which 
has already been covered by a petroleum agreement 
…” (Tonga Petroleum Mining Act, 1988, p. 8). 
 
Every exploration licence shall be for an initial 
period of 2 years and thereafter may be extended from 
time to time upon an application for the extension 
thereof made and supported by evidence that the 
licensee had in fact carried out during the currency of 
the license exploration work upon a reasonable scale 
(Tonga Petroleum Mining Act, 1988, p. 8). 
 
Lastly, nowhere in the Tonga Petroleum Mining Act (Revised 
Edition 1988) was liability for environmental damage explicitly 
specified.  Truthfully, the legislation reflected the original date 
in which it was first instated as law, 1969.  Tonga’s petroleum 
act was out of time and out of line with the present day reality 
of climate change and environmental conservation.  A 
discernible disparity became apparent.  There was an absence 
of legal responsibility put on the state and petroleum 
companies to practice a duty of care towards the environment 
inside Tonga’s exclusive economic zone.  Starkly this 
contrasted against strict liability obligations under 
international law.  In international waters, states and 
companies were required to conduct environmentally 
responsible seabed mineral exploration and exploitation. 
Published in his 2014 article on Tonga’s risky seabed 
mining ventures for the New Zealand International Review, 
Yoichiro Sato remarked that Modulus Pacific Company Limited 
was looking for an “international investment of US$20-40 
million” (Sato, 2014, p. 20).  The amount Sato noted was 
business start-up capital for preliminary “exploration” said to 
Off the Deep End 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
205 
commence this year.  Not one public notice released by the 
advisory committee based in the Tongan Prime Minister’s 
Office or from the company itself gestured to a start date. 
 
The area amounts to 5.5 per cent of the Tongan 
EEZ, and international investment of US$20-40 million 
is sought for the initial exploration, which will start in 
2014. (Sato, 2014, p. 20).   
 
Sato explained the problematic context couching 
petroleum exploration inside “37,000 square kilometers” of 
Tonga’s exclusive economic zone (Sato, 2014, p. 20).  Put 
simply, “despite Tonga’s ‘democratic transition’ after the 
Nuku’alofa riot of 2006, the royal family continues to dominate 
its politics” (Sato, 2014, p. 20).  It was fair enough comment to 
suggest that Dr Kairat Sydykov’s elusiveness would have been 
publicly honed in on and grilled if he were not affiliated to the 
princess regent Pilolevu as a business shareholder.  How could 
an island Kingdom enact a discrete separation of power of 
traditional rulers from elected political leaders when citizens 
were not free to question, criticise, and overturn by majority 
consensus high-level decisions made behind closed doors to 
privilege a few and disenfranchise the masses? 
 
Despite Tonga’s ‘democratic transition’ after the 
Nuku’alofa riot of 2006, the royal family continues to 
dominate its politics.  …An investor group, comprising 
mysterious firms allegedly based in Denver and London 
and centred on a Russian individual, signed 
agreements with the Tongan government on 
hydrocarbons exploration and mining and established 
three Tonga-registered subsidiaries.  Princess Royal 
Pilolevu Tuita owns 20 per cent shares in each of the 
three subsidiary firms, and the three firms were given 
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exploration rights for eleven years and production rights 
for 35 years in the event of discovery of minerals in the 
‘37,000 square kilometers of marine scheduled lands.’ 
(Sato, 2014, pp. 19-20). 
 
 
Are the Minerva Reefs secured within Tonga’s state 
sovereignty? 
Realistically, the Tongan public’s interest in the continental 
shelf converged on whether the Minerva Reefs renamed Teleki 
Tokelau for north Minerva Reef and Teleki Tonga for south 
Minerva Reef were fixed within state borders (Cahoon, 2014).2  
If the Tongan state’s second partial submission on the outer 
limits of the continental shelf for a sea zone in the Lau-Colville 
Ridge was recognised, would this mean the Minerva Reefs were 
internationally recognised as belonging to Tonga?  In short, 
yes it would be interpreted in such a way; although Fiji’s 
dispute of the underwater reefs being counted as Tongan 
territory under the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 
was an ongoing campaign which the Fijian government was 
determined to confront and overturn by a legal course of 
action. 
 
There are various issues that need to be attended 
to.  We have taken the legal line, the legal process 
regarding various other issues that have been raised at 
Minerva Reef as issued through government, a 
statement last week.  We will follow the legal process 
as under the UNCLOS provision of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and that’s in train. (Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum, Fiji interim attorney general cited in Rogers, 
2011).  
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The beacon on Teleki Tonga, the south Minerva Reef, 
which is manned by His Majesty’s Armed Forces for the 
Kingdom of Tonga.  Photograph: Bob Belcher, 22 May 
2008. 
 
In fact, Fiji’s legal construal of international law was that 
the Minerva Reefs “are inside Fiji’s Exclusive Economic Zone” 
according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982).  Here were the western Pacific neighbours, Tonga 
and Fiji, with mutual histories of intermarriage, trade, 
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resettlement, and cultural exchange.  They had taken the 
same law and underwater reefs, giving them totally opposite 
meanings.  Somewhere along the borderline they had stopped 
listening and communicating as neighbours, relatives, traders, 
and allies with more in common than in difference, and in a 
nutshell, it escalated the relationship trouble. 
The second partial submission of 2014, in essence, fronted 
up to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) and to the Fijian government by 
stating explicitly that Tonga had sovereign ownership of Teleki 
Tokelau and Teleki Tonga.  A plain-spoken strategy of spelling 
out national jurisdiction was elected for the reason that 
lengthening the outer limits of the continental shelf into the 
Lau-Colville Ridge was tied to measuring Tonga’s geographic 
proximity to the sea area under claim. 
Notably, Tonga recognised the underwater reefs as “the 
islands of Teleki Tonga and Teleki Tokelau” (Kingdom of 
Tonga, 2014, p. 3).  In the partial submission text, islands was 
the operative word signalling the Minerva Reefs were by the 
state’s estimation landed property as opposed to a maritime 
zone or space.  Distinguishing and naming Teleki Tokelau and 
Teleki Tonga as islands not underwater coral ridges, crests, or 
mounds, had been adopted from King Taufa’ahau Tupou VI’s 
1972 royal proclamation that the Minerva Reefs fell within 
Tonga’s dominion. 
This was not without regional divergence.  New Zealand 
foreign minister Murray McCully commented to public 
television news that south Minerva Reef was a “zone,” 
revealing that to him this was a sea area: “The fact we’ve seen 
Navies getting into potential contact in the zone is pretty 
unhelpful frankly” (McCully cited in One News, 2011).  
In 2014, the historical and cultural tradition of redefining 
two underwater reefs as islands and landmass of sovereign 
territory was uniquely continued.  Tonga employed the legal 
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term “historic title” to validate by international law that the 
1972 royal proclamation had made the Minerva Reefs part of 
the state (Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 2).  Under this 
interpretation, the state had the title to the property Teleki 
Tokelau and Teleki Tonga, whereby title constituted the legal 
basis for the state’s ownership of this particular property. 
 
On 15 June 1972, a Royal Proclamation was 
published in the gazette of the Government of the 
Kingdom of Tonga asserting jurisdiction and control 
over the islands of Teleki Tonga and Teleki Tokelau: …  
The islands of Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga were 
recognized as part of the Tongan national territory by 
the South Pacific Forum of States in September 1972. 
(Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, pp. 2-3).   
 
The Tongan government had concentrated on outspreading 
first into “the eastern part of the Kermadec Ridge” adjoining its 
south-eastern EEZ, and then into “the western part of the Lau 
[Colville] Ridge” flanking its south-western EEZ (Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 2010, pp. 12-13).  But 
the wished-for enlargement was bound to cause friction and 
hold-ups in gaining assent as Lau-Colville collided with Fiji’s 
2009 partial submission, and Kermadec crashed into New 
Zealand’s 2006 partial submission.  Tonga was treading water 
beyond its national border contested by Fiji and New Zealand 
as theirs. 
For Tongan nationals it was neither Lau-Colville or 
Kermadec but Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga that stirred 
patriotism rooted in historical and emotional ties.  Ordinary 
Tongans wanted an end to the June 2011 Minerva Reefs clash 
with the Fijian Navy from reoccurring or even worse, mounting 
into military action.  Assurances from state leaders that the 
border encounter would not repeat itself had been minimal.  In 
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citizens’ eyes, the Fijian neighbours had gotten unruly and 
needed to be told to stay in their own backyard and not come 
over looking to make trouble. 
It was Samiu Vaipulu, Tonga’s deputy prime minister who 
played straight into the hands of public anxiety and broke 
silence to the New Zealand media.  Oddly, he was not the 
Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano who as the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs was expected far greater than his deputy to 
transmit a leadership message of conciliatory level-headed 
sense to the nation and region.  Contrarily, Vaipulu confirmed 
a diplomat’s worst nightmare “that if anyone interferes, action 
will be taken” (One News, 2011). 
Referring to the Fijian Navy incident where “Tonga’s 
navigational equipment” on the Minerva Reefs had been 
“dismantled,” Vaipulu was not modest in saying that “they ran 
away” when sighting the arrival of the Tongan Navy (One 
News, 2011).  Whether the Fijian Navy did flee as the deputy 
prime minister alleged was not the political point. 
The fact was that in June of 2011 when the row erupted at 
sea, the heads of government were not in direct one-on-one 
communication, and nor were there designated senior 
ministers leading discreet and sensitive discussions on 
contested ownership of the Minerva Reefs.  Indecisive 
leadership on Tonga’s part meant the prospect of taking the 
diplomatic pathway had been botched.  What did surface were 
nonessential players such as the deputy prime minister as well 
as a special advisor to the prime minister ‘Ahongalu 
Fusimalohi, repeating hearsay to overseas media before 
diplomatic talks between governments had been established as 
the initial method for conflict resolution. 
 
The Fijians recently went to the reef and 
dismantled Tonga’s navigational equipment.  In 
response, this week the Tongan government sent two of 
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its own navy boats to protect their claim.  “Our navy 
went back to their navy and they ran away [because] 
it’s our territory,” said [Tonga’s deputy prime minister 
Samiu] Vaipulu.  Tonga’s Navy is still at the reef putting 
up navigational lights.  The Tongan government [said] 
that if anyone interferes, action will be taken.  “The fact 
we’ve seen Navies getting into potential contact in the 
zone is pretty unhelpful frankly,” said [New Zealand] 
foreign minister Murray McCully. (One News, 2011). 
 
As far as I’m concerned there was nothing.  Well, 
maybe they [the Fijian and Tongan navies] may have 
met and waved at each other, but I would rather not 
speculate and infer that that was a confrontation or 
anything other than just probably meeting up at sea. 
(‘Ahongalu Fusimalohi, special advisor to Tonga’s prime 
minister cited in Rogers, 2011). 
 
Quick off the mark, New Zealand media put out a spin on 
how the New Zealand government read political relations 
between Fiji and Tonga.  “Fear” was the operative word (One 
News, 2011).  According to public television news, New 
Zealand “feared” the competing claims on the Minerva Reefs 
would ignite conflict, in particular, military engagement. 
 
The tit-for-tat battle is a situation New Zealand 
feared would happen.  Both Fiji and Tonga claim 
Minerva Reef as their own.  “They do not a have a right 
to those two islands, it belongs to his Majesty and the 
government of Tonga,” said Samiu Vaipulu, Tonga’s 
deputy Prime Minister. (One News, 2011). 
 
Compounding this style of crisis reporting, New Zealand 
media had devised a cowboy-type theory about the cause of 
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regional instability on the western Pacific frontier.  Essentially 
it was believed that Tevita Mara’s 2011 resettlement from Fiji 
to Tonga to evade sedition charges had upset the 
Bainimarama regime’s apple cart, turning the neighbours on 
each other. 
 
Fiji’s military Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama is 
furious that one of his former military leaders, 
Lieutenant Colonel Tevita Mara, has now been allowed 
into Australia.  The official Fijian government website 
refers to Tongan Navy boats at Minerva Reef, adding 
that New Zealand and Australia are rolling out the red 
carpet for Mara, who fled to Tonga last month after 
being charged with sedition in Fiji.  The government 
website says Mara fled as a fugitive but was issued 
with a Tongan passport and both Australia and New 
Zealand appear willing to grant him a visa. (One News, 
2011). 
 
There was a time early on in the Tu’ivakano government’s 
term when Tongan diplomacy could have offered a persuasive 
tactic for working out border disagreements vented by Fiji.  
Inside the senior cabinet clique Lord Ma’afu voiced his desire 
to pay a diplomatic visit to Suva, expressly to listen to and talk 
through Fijian government disapproval of Tonga’s sovereign 
declaration over the Minerva Reefs.  This was in February of 
2011, five months before the June border tussle between the 
countries’ respective navies. 
Tonga’s Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano who held the 
Foreign Affairs portfolio was open to Lord Ma’afu’s suggestion 
for diplomatic talks with Fiji.  He even considered travelling 
with him.  Tonga understood the politically precarious 
situation of managing relations with the Bainimarama military 
regime as well as their kinship ties to Fiji better than the New 
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Zealand government whose panic-stricken advice uttered by 
foreign minister Murray McCully was “for both sides to pause 
and reflect before upping the ante” (Field, 2011a). 
 
 
Lord Ma’afu at the late Lord Kalaniuvalu’s funeral in 
the Kingdom of Tonga.  Photograph: Melino Maka, April 
2010. 
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No prime minister or senior cabinet minister of 
significance to resolving the situation from the Fijian and 
Tongan governments was recklessly raising the stakes or 
gambling their country’s security with a neighbour of whom 
they shared an interwoven history.  To the contrary; at the 
beginning of 2011 Tonga was of the view that Ma’afu was an 
ideal negotiator in resolving matters with Fiji for two reasons 
that made relationship sense.  He was a former Tongan 
military officer who knew Fijian officers in the military 
government and he was a noble groomed in Tongan diplomacy 
as a senior statesman; and not just any noble.  The title 
Ma’afu resounded strongly with the 19th century Ma’afu who 
migrated from Tonga to Fiji’s Lau islands to permanently 
settle, becoming known as the Tu’i Lau, the King of Lau. 
Sila Balawa, Fiji’s deputy permanent secretary for foreign 
affairs, spoke to Fijian media in March of 2011 affirming that 
Tonga’s call for diplomacy and negotiation presented the way 
forward on the Minerva Reefs disagreement.  Balawa made it 
known the countries were “open to dialogue” because “Tonga 
is very close to Fiji and we have links, we can sit with them 
and talk” (Gopal, 2011). 
 
“As such, we maintain that it’s always a part of Fiji 
but now we have a counter claim from Tonga for the 
reef,” he said.  “But we are open to dialogue with Tonga 
on the Minerva Reef issue.  Since Tonga is very close to 
Fiji and we have links, we can sit with them and talk.”  
Mr Balawa said Fiji would sit with Tonga as friends 
and talk in an attempt to find an amicable solution to 
the problem.  “Talks are in progress for Fiji and Tonga 
to have bilateral talks on the reef issue and other 
issues,” he said.  “While no time frame has been set yet 
for the talks, it’s our hope that talks will materialise in 
the near future.” (Gopal, 2011).   
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Contextualising Tonga’s historical claim, on June 15th 
1972 the late King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV issued a royal 
proclamation officially claiming the underwater reefs as 
“islands” of the Kingdom of Tonga’s sovereign jurisdiction.  
Published in the English and Tongan languages by the Tonga 
Government Gazette Extraordinary, the writ was understood as 
a public declaration under national law and as being 
concordant with international decrees. 
Tonga’s maritime claims did have a longer history 
originating from the 19th century constitutional monarch King 
George Tupou I laying down an ocean dominion for his 
sovereign country.  In many ways, it was Tupou I who set a 
precedent for how “historic title” over Tonga’s maritime 
borders was inaugurated to which the 2014 partial submission 
on the outer limits of continental shelf traced the country’s 
legal jurisdiction (Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, p. 14). 
On August 24th 1887 the first monarch issued a royal 
proclamation in the Tonga Government Gazette that would 
“limit and define the extent and boundaries of Our Kingdom” 
(King George Tubou 1, 1887). 
 
We do hereby erect as Our Kingdom of Tonga all 
islands, rocks, reefs, foreshore and waters lying 
between the fifteenth and twenty-third and a half 
degrees of south latitude and between the one hundred 
and seventy-third and the one hundred and seventy-
seventh degrees of west longitude from the Meridian of 
Greenwich. (King George Tupou I, 1887). 
 
Moving forward to the 20th century royal proclamation of 
King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV in 1972, for forty-two years to the 
present-day His Majesty’s Armed Forces had taken 
responsibility for manning the beacons on Teleki Tokelau and 
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Teleki Tonga warning vessels of the underwater reefs, and for 
patrolling the Minerva Reefs and their twelve mile perimeter 
(King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, 1972). 
 
Whereas the Reefs known as North Minerva Reef 
and South Minerva Reef have long served as fishing 
grounds for the Tongan people and have long been 
regarded as belonging to the Kingdom of Tonga has 
now created on the Reefs islands known as Teleki 
Tokelau and Teleki Tonga; and whereas it is expedient 
that we should now confirm the rights of the Kingdom 
of Tonga to these islands; therefore we do hereby affirm 
and proclaim that the islands, rocks, reefs, foreshores 
and waters lying within a radius of twelve miles thereof 
are part of our Kingdom of Tonga. (King Taufa’ahau 
Tupou IV, 1972). 
 
At the thirty-eighth year of Taufa’ahau the IV’s royal 
proclamation in 2005, the Minerva Reefs flared up as a bone of 
territorial contention and contestation between the Kingdom of 
Tonga and the Republic of Fiji.  Backing out on a former 
agreement, Fiji lodged a complaint with the International 
Seabed Authority stating it did not recognise Tonga’s maritime 
claim that Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga were under its state 
sovereignty. 
The political inconsistency at work was highly 
questionable.  At the 1972 South Pacific Forum in Suva, Fiji 
from the 12th to the 14th of September the member states, 
including the Republic of the Fiji Islands hosting the forum, 
agreed in principle to “Tonga’s historical association with the 
Minerva Reefs” in “that there could be no question of 
recognising other claims to sovereignty over the reefs” (South 
Pacific Forum, 1972, p. 3). 
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The “other claims” referred expressly to “the Ocean Life 
Research Association” founded by “[Las] Vegas real estate 
millionaire Michael Oliver” who desired to build a “libertarian 
society” free of “state intervention” on the underwater reefs 
(South Pacific Forum, 1972, p. 3; Newland, 2006).  The 
counter claimant was not, at this time, Fiji.      
 
Members of the Forum recognised Tonga’s historical 
association with the Minerva Reefs, welcomed the 
Tongan Government’s continuing interest in the area 
and agreed that there could be no question of 
recognising other claims, and specifically that of the 
Ocean Life Research Foundation, to sovereignty over 
the reefs. (South Pacific Forum, 1972, p. 3). 
 
There were geopolitical drivers prompting Fiji’s decision to 
break its word on the South Pacific Forum’s 1972 agreement 
by renouncing in 2005 to the International Seabed Authority 
that the Minerva Reefs belonged to Tonga.  It was speculated 
the Fijian government had reservations about Tonga’s deep 
sea mining ambition to be a sponsoring state in international 
waters, namely the Lau-Colville Ridge. 
If Tonga’s possession of the Minerva Reefs as a maritime 
territory was left unchallenged then it looked promisingly 
positioned to make a continental shelf move into “the western 
part of the Lau [Colville] Ridge,” acquiring this ocean domain 
for mineral exploration (Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, 2010, pp. 12-13).  Understandably Fiji 
desired this ocean terrain exclusively for its own seabed 
mining endeavours. 
The 2009 partial submissions by the Republic of the Fiji 
Islands and the Kingdom of Tonga presented one month apart 
in April and May to the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) were a warning sign.  
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On paper these proposals might have looked to sidestep a 
Minerva Reefs embroilment on an international stage.  But 
boiling under sea level border tensions had not subsided in 
country-to-country interactions. 
The game changer in 2014 was that Tonga’s second partial 
submission was set to reignite anxieties on Fiji and Tonga’s 
rivalled claims that tried to step each other out.  By extending 
the country’s 200 mile exclusive economic zone 60 nautical 
miles into the Lau-Colville Ridge, Tonga had wilfully 
repositioned itself in a second border fracas with Fiji.  Already 
quarrelling because Teleki Tokelau and Teleki Tonga had not 
been unequivocally resolved to Fiji’s satisfaction, the longer 
diplomatic communication was bungled the more it allowed 
political conditions to fertilise angst, tension, and 
unpredictable dogfights. 
Tonga’s two partial submissions on the outer limits of the 
continental shelf argued that “overlaps have not been resolved 
by means of maritime boundary delimitation agreements 
among the three States [Tonga, Fiji, and New Zealand] to this 
date (Kingdom of Tonga, 2009, p. 5; Kingdom of Tonga, 2014, 
p. 16). 
 
These two parts of the Kermadec and Lau Ridges 
are regions over which there are overlaps of maritime 
spaces under the national jurisdictions of the Kingdom 
of Tonga, the Republic of the Fiji Islands, and New 
Zealand.  These overlaps have not been resolved by 
means of maritime boundary delimitation agreements 
among the three States to this date. (Kingdom of Tonga, 
2009, p. 5). 
 
An acute observation initially penned in 2009, five years 
later in 2014 the same tune was being sung but this time, 
switched up a notch.  Was Tonga any closer to preventing 
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three countries – Tonga, Fiji, and New Zealand – from having 
outer continental shelf collisions?  Had the Fiji and Tonga feud 
over two underwater reefs, which Tonga saw were their 
islands, been settled?  Would Tonga attain an adequate law in 
2014 protecting the ocean floor from deep sea mining damage 
and the state from liability? 
Tendering a second partial submission to the United 
Nations maintaining the same position to that which was 
written in the first was telling.  Twice “boundary delimitation” 
had not, by any means, settled continental shelf crossovers 
between states (Kingdom of Tonga, 2009, p. 5; Kingdom of 
Tonga, 2014, p. 16).  The obstacle was evident but the way out 
blurry.  Therefore, testing the legal practicability of charting a 
60 nautical mile line from a country’s baseline EEZ out to 
open sea, while knowing it would crash into a neighbouring 
country doing the identical exercise, was the whole point to 
proving “boundary delimitation” would not achieve the 
objective. 
Which brought up a consequential query on boundary 
concessions between states: who decided the final 
delimitations to be made on marking out a state’s continental 
shelf borderline in the situation of boundary conflicts?  Being 
a state party to the United Nations Convention to the Law of 
the Sea (1982) since August 2nd 1995 meant Tonga had 
assented to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) as an authority on applying international law to 
how the state’s outer limits would be defined and confined. 
The Tongan government understood that international law 
did not give clear-cut answers to concluding discrepancies 
between states.  What it had to confront was whether the 
United Nations system allowed the state to decide if the 
commission’s recommendations on the second partial 
submission were an accurate application of the Law of the Sea 
(1982).  Based on the 1972 royal proclamation over the 
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Minerva Reefs, Tonga considered it had an unparalleled case 
and resultantly propelled this argument as the legal, historic, 
and cultural bargaining point.  If its case was rejected, what 
possibilities for redress and challenging the decision-making 
process were there? 
Noteworthy is the one-off consultation that did take place 
between states – Tonga, Fiji, and New Zealand – was part of 
the United Nations submissions procedure under article 76, 
annex II of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).  
Under the convention, a party state practiced a courtesy of 
asking another state on whose boundary they overlapped if 
they objected to their submission. 
The standard convention was that the state being asked 
would not oppose, but instead, agree to the commission 
deliberating on the submission so as to appear an impartial 
objective party.  Simultaneously they would make it known 
that the neighbour’s continental shelf border intersected with 
their own claim.  As the official communication exchange 
between states the purpose was to show the commission they 
had complied with international law and behaved “without 
prejudice” to one another’s submissions on delimiting 
continental shelf boundaries. 
 
Fiji and its eastern neighbour, the Kingdom of 
Tonga, have held consultations concerning Fiji’s 
submission of information to the Commission.  The 
Government of the Kingdom of Tonga has agreed not to 
object to the consideration by the Commission of this 
partial submission.  This partial submission of 
information by Fiji to the Commission is without 
prejudice to delimitation of maritime boundary with the 
Kingdom of Tonga. (Republic of the Fiji Islands, 2009, p. 
5). 
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New Zealand notes that the area of extended 
continental shelf along the eastern Kermadec Ridge 
beyond 200 nautical miles contained in the Tongan 
submission overlaps in part with the area of extended 
continental shelf contained in the Northern Region of 




An honest debate 
To turn an incisive jab towards my own kind – Pacific Islander 
academics, researchers, and writers – a dysfunctional aspect 
of the entire continental shelf business going off in our 
homeland states was the deficiency of opposition and debate.  
In theory, this should have been part-and-parcel of academia’s 
social responsibility to bring to the public domain. 
To our own detriment in the second decade of the 21st 
century, individuals and collectives affiliated to universities 
and research institutes who self-identify as Pacific Islanders 
have become spectators and onlookers of homeland state 
politics.  By not saying anything, they have made themselves 
virtually redundant and out of the critic’s job.  Conventionally, 
the role of the critic continues to be overrun by Palangi 
(white/European) academics, along with a handful of Pacific 
Islander reporters and political commentators scurrying 
behind the knowledge authorities represented as scholarly 
book writers and intellectuals who are not their own people.  I 
say this partly as a disappointed idealist who credits a 
somewhat old-school convention that intellectual freedom 
matters. 
Often I am perplexed that my own identity group, Tongans, 
are quick to brag about the number of conferred doctorates 
they boast for a small population.  If the truth be told, the 
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highly educated stay silent, electing not to publish criticism of 
structural power disparities manoeuvred by traditional 
hierarchy and a top-heavy state resistant to further political 
reform.  What is the point of gaining a doctoral degree, 
particularly in the human social sciences where most Tongans 
study, if one does not invest in this qualification to provoke 
critical thought and push boundaries of civil freedoms for 
greater social inclusion? 
In the contemporary political climate where the research 
industry is commercially operated through government grants 
generating sought after revenue for the university coffers, 
business expediency gags criticism and independent thinking.  
Sovereignty and self-determination are therefore not principles 
exclusively measuring the confidence and safety of 
independent states.  Academia, like media, experiences border 
security unrests.  As the world becomes increasingly 
structured by global governance and corporate economics 
cementing single narratives of power, writing dissent and 
nonconformity is harder to sustain where many, as in the case 
of Tongan academics, are fearful to speak back to power. 
It is difficult to find a homeland audience for unrestrained 
criticism, especially when Pacific Island states are 
indoctrinated to think and behave as the United Nations small 
island developing states; tiny, less important, and dependent 
on rich countries for their mere survival and right to exist as 
the poorer peoples of planet Earth in all ways imaginable.  
“What do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5). 
Partha Chatterjee in his 1993 book The Nation and its 
Fragments rationalised that the model scenario for developing 
states was co-authored by the United States and Europe for 
the unfortunate rest of the world.  In the present-day, they 
continue to compose the dominant plot on how non-American 
and non-European others can emerge from colonial vestiges of 
empire into independent peripheral nations; always yielding to 
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Western control of world affairs and grateful to be minor allies 
and aid recipients. 
As a result, Chatterjee’s line of reasoning constructed a 
counter narrative.  In context, “even our imagination must 
remain forever colonized” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5).  Self-will 
and self-determination vital to thinking outside “certain 
modular forms” of “nationalism,” the state, and development 
have been thought out for the world’s developing states to 
unthinkingly consume, digest, and excrete (Chatterjee, 1993, 
p. 5).  Force-fed to countries delineated as the Third World, 
this dominant discourse presents itself as “history,” fact, and 
the only truth available to them (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5).  And 
for that which we are about to receive, we are truly grateful; (a 
pun on an Americanised model verse for a Christian ritual of 
giving thanks before a meal, wholly intended). 
 
History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the 
postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of 
modernity.  Europe and the Americas, the only true 
subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not 
only the script of colonial enlightenment and 
exploitation, but also that of our anticolonial resistance 
and postcolonial misery.  Even our imagination must 
remain forever colonized. (Chatterjee, 1994, p. 5). 
 
American professor of history Stephen Cohen 
retrospectively viewed “the late 1970s and early 80s” as a 
golden age where dissent politics were publicly debated in 
mainstream media (Cohen, 2014).  Tinged with nostalgia and 
sentimentality for an era he actively participated in as an 
American scholar of the political left, Cohen differentiated 
between the past and present conditions under which critics 
operate in public life.  Back then, he mused, “we were always 
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in a minority” but at least “we were present [and] we got our 
say” (Cohen, 2014). 
 
I participated in the debates of the late 1970s and 
early 80s.  They were called the debate between the 
détente-ists, those of us who wanted to reduce the cold 
war and the cold warriors who wanted to step up the 
cold war with the Soviet Union.  But there was a real 
debate.  We, the détente-ists were always in a minority, 
always in a minority; but we were present on the op-ed 
[opinion piece opposite the editorial] pages of the main 
American newspapers.  This was before cable TV, but 
we were on television; we were on radio; we got our 
say. (Cohen, 2014). 
 
To return to my dig at why public debate on Tonga’s 
continental shelf politics and its association to deep sea 
mining had not shown up for the match, American foreign 
correspondent Chris Hedges made an insightful comment.  
Referring to how the United States Obama administration 
botched diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation over 
the Ukraine crisis as it currently unfolds, he exclaimed that 
“the last thing they’re interested in [the American government] 
is an honest debate” (Hedges, 2014). 
 
Well the last thing they’re interested in is an honest 
debate.  They have, they will pick and select, chose 
facts and even sometimes incidents that are not fact to 
perpetuate the narrative that they seek to disseminate.  
I mean, as a foreign correspondent my job was often 
[at] times to report on incidents and events that 
puncture that narrative, and that was true of every 
administration I covered. (Hedges, 2014). 
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Here, I reflect on Hedges’ notion that the government will 
deliberately hand “pick and select, chose facts and even 
sometimes incidents that are not fact to perpetuate the 
narrative that they seek to disseminate” (Hedges, 2014).  In 
saying this, what is the Tongan state narrative on continental 
shelf politics, and how does it contradict the integration of 
climate adaptation into a national policy framework? 
 
 
The Tongan state narrative 
February 25th 2014 saw ‘Aisake Eke, the Minister for Finance 
and National Planning at the Government of Tonga sign a 
grant agreement for $23.1 million Tongan pa’anga with the 
Asian Development Bank’s director general of the Pacific 
department, Xianbin Yao (Matangi Tonga, 2014).  Tonga was 
one of nineteen developing states selected for the bank’s Pilot 
Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR). (Asian Development 
Bank, 2014a, 2014b). 
The Ministry for Lands, Environment, Climate Change and 
Natural Resources who had pitched the proposal for funding 
was responsible for coordinating Tonga’s climate resilience 
sector project across the state bureaucracy and vulnerable 
communities, and reporting to government and donors on 
progress and outcomes.  This was the same ministry under 
Lord Ma’afu who also rolled out Tonga’s deep sea mining 
enterprise as a state sponsor to Nautilus Minerals 
Incorporated.  Detectably, there existed a policy disjuncture in 
that one ministry carried out resilience and exploitation 
concurrently under the pretext of environmental and natural 
resource sustainability. 
Climate Investment Funds at the World Bank Group had 
set aside US $1.3 billion dollars for the pilot programme, with 
money being distributed to country projects focused on 
strengthening resistance to climate change in state law, policy, 
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infrastructure, budgets, as well as community activities 
(Climate Change Funds, 2014).  There were five international 
banks financing Climate Investment Funds – African 
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European 
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank – with the World 
Bank Group manning the money from its Washington DC 
headquarters.  Three participating countries from the Pacific 
Islands region, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga 
competed for small slices of the US 1.3 billion dollar pie to 
stage their national climate strategies (Asian Development 
Bank, 2014a, 2014b; Climate Investment Funds, 2014). 
Climate Investment Funds approved Tonga’s grant “under 
phase II of the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR)” 
on December 9th 2013 (Asian Development Bank, 2014a).   It 
took two months for the sign-off in Nuku’alofa and an “initial 
endowment of $5 million” Tongan pa’anga “for the Tonga 
Climate Change Trust Fund” to be officiated (Matangi Tonga, 
2014; Asian Development Bank, 2014b).  Perceptibly, the 
Tongan state’s novel scheme was to set-up a national trust 
that disbursed “small grants to help communities implement 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk resilience 
projects.”  It was thought to be “a first for the Pacific” Islands 
region (Matangi Tonga, 2014). 
 
[The climate resilience sector project will] support an 
innovative sustainable financing mechanism that will 
provide small grants to help communities implement 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk resilience 
projects – a first for the Pacific in climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk reduction.  An initial 
endowment of $5 million will be provided to the Tonga 
Climate Change Trust Fund. (Matangi Tonga, 2014). 
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Tonga had one major hitch to getting its climate resilience 
sector project off the ground in the most susceptible 
communities as well as embedded into state institutions.  
“There is no Cabinet endorsed government strategy for climate 
change adaptation formally in place yet in Tonga” (Climate 
Investment Funds, 2012, p. 5).  And nor would there likely be 
ratification at the national executive in the near future; 
certainly not with the Tu’ivakano government. 
Ranked highly by Tonga’s cabinet was the drive for 
“increased offshore resources,” namely deep sea minerals.  “An 
extended continental shelf” would deliver seabed riches if the 
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) gave a seal of approval to the two partial 
submissions pending decision (Government of Tonga, 2014).  
Obtaining a continental shelf rubber stamp under 
international law was fast proving to be easier said than done.  
But despite the legal complexity of getting tangled up in the 
neighbours’ boundaries, the Tongan government was banking 
on “a positive ruling and acceptance of Tonga’s submission” 
(Government of Tonga, 2014). 
 
A positive ruling and acceptance of Tonga’s 
submission on an extended continental shelf by the 
Commission will open up many opportunities for the 
Kingdom in terms of increased offshore resources, 
which can potentially contribute to Tonga’s sustainable 
development and economic growth. (Government of 
Tonga, 2014). 
 
And here lay the continental shelf conundrum.  The 
“sustainable development” of deep sea minerals “and economic 
growth” cancelled out any credibility that climate resilience 
would be Tonga’s overarching national priority (Government of 
Tonga, 2014).  Put simply, the Government of Tonga was 
Off the Deep End 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
228 
pushing two contradictory positions – economic growth by 
seabed mineral exploitation and resistance to climate change – 
which effectively were irreconcilable state policies and 
approaches aimed at securing a sound future for the next 
generation. 
In the end, the market won out.  And why would it not be 
the stronghold of how poor countries imagine development 
into existence?  It was Gilbert Rist who wrote “the market 
inevitably fans economic and military competition for access to 
(unevenly distributed) resources” (Rist, 1997, p. 187).  The 
market, a term that can be used instead of the economy, relies 
on competition to thrive as the epitome of development; which 
is what Tonga and Fiji were doing over the Minerva Reefs and 
their continental shelf claims in the Lau-Colville Ridge.  
Stripped down to the naked truth, they were in “competition 
for access to (unevenly distributed) resources,” deep sea 
minerals (Rist, 1997, p. 187). 
 
 
In social memory and meaning 
I would not write about the Kingdom of Tonga’s affiliation to 
and affection for two coral reefs which lie largely underwater, 
revealing themselves modestly at low tide, if the story did not 
resonate in my own social memory and meaning.  I have a 
dead uncle buried in 1962 on Teleki Tonga, the south Minerva 
Reef, along with three Tongan nationals.  He was shipwrecked 
along with his father and fifteen Tongan men who were the 
crew and passengers aboard the Tuaikaepau.  He died of 
dehydration the day before rescuers from the Royal New 
Zealand Air Force dropped supplies to the survivors.  
His name was Fetaiaki Pulu and he was my father 
Seminati Pulu’s first cousin.  Their fathers were brothers, 
Soakai and Sioeli Pulu from Kolonga in the eastern district of 
Tongatapu, Tonga’s main island.  Soakai Pulu and four of his 
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six sons, Fetaiaki, Toni, Sione, and Viliami are inscribed in 
oral history as the Kolonga boxing family, all having held 
national heavyweight titles.  Soakai was Tonga’s undefeated 
heavyweight national titleholder for nineteen years from 1934 
to 1953. 
He retired from boxing as the undefeated South Pacific 
heavyweight champion, most notably having beat a Fijian for 
the regional title by the name of Seminati.  According to the 
Pulu family account, after the match Seminati asked Soakai to 
give his next son his Fijian first name to remember him by.  
My father, Soakai’s nephew, was to whom he gave this Fijian 
boxer’s name.  Dad was born in October of 1947. 
Seminati (my father) was the Pulu family’s only national 
sprinter who won two bronze medals for Tonga in the 100 and 
200 meters at the 1969 South Pacific Games held at Port 
Moresby in Papua New Guinea from the 14th to the 20th of 
August.  He was twenty-one years old and tied second equal 
for both events with a New Hebrides sprinter Charles Godden.  
Awarded third place behind Godden, the gold medal went to a 
white French national Jean Bourne who represented French 
Polynesia. 
In 1969 he paid his own airfare to the games and was not 
subsidised by the Government of Tonga for travel, starting 
blocks, and spikes (his sprint shoes).  He was on a plumbing 
apprenticeship with the New Zealand Railways in Dunedin, 
and had been sent to the South Island in 1966 via a Tongan 
government trade training scholarship.  A return airfare from 
Dunedin to Port Moresby was costly in the 1960s.  The head 
plumber at the railways to whom he was apprenticed, an old 
Pakeha (white/European) man from Port Chalmers of Scottish 
descent, pitched in to financially assist.  Dad has never 
forgotten him. 
The state issued my father with a uniform and a 
registration number, not that he has ever complained or 
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expected the Tongan government to pay his way.  As an old 
fashioned Tongan who grew up before the aid and remittance 
psychology of hand-outs and monetary donations took hold of 
people’s values, Seminati was satisfied with representing King 
and country.  “That was enough for me,” he has maintained 
for forty-five years.  He is now sixty-six years old. 
Compared to his heavyweight boxer cousins, Seminati was 
small in stature weighing in at 66 kilograms and 5 feet 8 
inches in height.  He sprinted because an individual sport in 
contrast to a team sport was the mentality he had been 
socialised with as a young boy training alongside his older 
cousin who boxed, Fetaiaki Pulu.  Ritualistically they would 
run the Hahake beach road at 5 am in the morning before my 
father went to school.  I believe dad was raised in a village 
environment to be independent, psychologically tough, 
physically athletic, and disciplined. 
As a child, I thought this was indicative of all fathers from 
Tonga.  As an adult, I learned this was not true but more, 
Seminati’s personality type moulded by family-specific values 
and growing up bush; that is, being descended from a specific 
Tongan village juxtaposed (and discriminated against) as the 
archetypical country bumpkins who were considered the total 
opposite of town folk. 
My dad has his own quirkiness and prejudices.  He 
comments with disbelief, bordering disdain, about the current 
trend of obesity and non-communicable diseases rampant 
among Tongans.  In all honesty, by his memory of the past 
Tongans were not overweight, physically inactive, and 
unhealthy.  They were survivors, resourceful, hard-working, 
and self-willed like him; at least the men from the bush were 
according to his memoirs. 
When Dad won the Tonga secondary schools athletics 
titles for the 100 and 200 meters in his senior year for 
‘Apifo’ou College in 1965, he set national youth records.  He 
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was officially recorded on file as Seni Pulu because Seminati or 
Semi for short was an unfamiliar sounding Fijian name.  To 
this very day Tongans get my father’s first name wrong, calling 
him Sam, Sammy, or Seni.  It grates me that Tongan language 
speakers do not listen carefully and pronounce his Fijian first 
name correctly.  And here I am, exposing my own quirkiness 
and prejudices; like father, like daughter. 
 
 
The author’s father Seminati Pulu at sixty-six years 
old coaching students of Mo’unga ‘Olive middle school in 
his Tongan village, Kolonga, competing at the secondary 
school athletics championships.  Photograph: Teena 
Brown Pulu, 4 April 2014. 
 
I do make a conscientious effort to correct them and 
explain he was named after a Fijian heavyweight boxer who 
fought his paternal uncle, Soakai Pulu.  I behave like this 
because it is the family history of travels, events, and 
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encounters I have inherited from paternity, from my Kolonga 
father, through social memory passed down in story across 
generations where most of our kinfolk now live in America, 
Australia, and New Zealand. 
Kolonga families are transnational clans, the majority 
residing in diaspora and tracing ancestral ties to this origin 
village, a rural farming settlement where boxers, sprinters, 
and the odd academic are claimed and remembered as our 
people.  Being vigilant and staunch about to whom I descend 
from and to where in the Pacific Ocean I trace my roots is the 
one method I possess as a daughter born in diaspora to 
honour my migrant father. 
The contents of my life are a meaningful and purposeful 
reminder not to waste openings and breaks I have been 
afforded in New Zealand, my developed country of birth.  In 
Tonga, my father was not given the same rights of access into 
the world, but rather, made chances to better himself happen 
out of sheer guts and an iron will that he and his descendants 
would secure a better future.  We have that security in 
Auckland, my children and I.  We are grateful not to have been 
born into a poor country, or worse still as Deepak Chopra 
observed, to be born into a poor family in a wealthy country 
such as New Zealand.   
Poverty is a state of mind.  Psychologically it can destroy 
the human spirit to do more than survive circumstances of 
birth, but live well, live every moment with reason, principle, 
and self-worth.  Sadly I see this happen in Tonga today with 
dispossessed youth and women merely existing in a poor aid-
dependent society under the rule of men and their privileged 
women supporters who show no empathy towards how the 
other half live, and quite frankly, strut their complete and 
utter ignorance.  When other people’s lives of which you have 
no first-hand experience are not included in political 
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consciousness one can quickly become emblematic of the 
oppressor, the tormenter, the intimidator. 
I write this as a woman, a New Zealander who traces her 
ancestry to Tonga, and one who feels jaded by the language of 
international law and policy dominating Tonga’s political 
pursuits.  Seldom, if ever, have the policy directives of the 
Tu’ivakano government solved the country’s quandaries, which 
are more often than not fast-money driven with little 
comprehension about the enduring consequences of taking 
shortcuts, doing knock-up jobs, and selling the seabed at a 
discount price.  The state contradicts itself; asserting climate 
adaptation and resilience on the one hand, while aggressively 
exploiting the ocean for minerals, oil, and tuna. 
It is one preoccupation for the Tongan state to sponsor 
mining companies in international waters, but it is another to 
collect sufficient royalties to mend a broke economy or for that 
matter, fix a wrecked environment.  Just as it is one matter to 
carry out the legalities of acquiring a continental shelf, but it 
is another to exclude the very people who remember the true 
meaning of underwater reefs and to whom an enlarged ocean-
scape is intended to serve, in theory.  Their stories are worth 
validating in a bureaucratic process that holds little relevance 
for citizens, and gains little buy-in from them if they are not 
included, informed, and involved. 
Amidst the political fracture of wrestling the neighbour to 
hold on to underwater reefs that most Tongan nationals would 
never visit in their lifetime, there is one point of which I am 
quite sure of.  If I sat down with any one of my friends who are 
Fijian nationals living in the homeland state or diaspora here 
in Auckland and told them my Tongan father’s story of his first 
cousin who died on the south Minerva Reef, they would listen 
sympathetically.  They would appreciate his emotional bond to 
a place in the ocean he had never been, but felt certain that it 
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was part of his beloved country.  And they would liken this 
human circumstance to their own. 
The Government of Tonga should have listened and talked 
with care to the Fijian neighbours and relatives in February 
2011 when Lord Ma’afu recommended a diplomatic visit to 
Suva.  Back then, it was doable.  Now, the opening had 
narrowed and almost four years on the Tu’ivakano government 
was at a close.  As the Russian Federation foreign minister 
Sergey Lavrov described his one-on-one communication with 
the United States secretary of state John Carey over the 
present-day Ukraine crisis: “Personally we have very good 
chemistry, but we also understand that there are superiors, 
advisors, which sometimes doesn’t help” (Lavrov, 2014). 
Lavrov aptly illustrated the political conditions under 
which Ma’afu worked in the Tongan government case.  He 
enjoyed cordial relationships with the Fijian government 
regime.  At the same time he was answerable to his “superiors” 
and their “advisors, which sometimes doesn’t help,” frankly 
because they were not the right people to proficiently carry out 
diplomatic talks with a foreign country and close neighbour of 
whom your country stands in disagreement (Lavrov, 2014).  
For Tonga, another chapter written on how not to do 
diplomacy.  A tactical approach to strengthening regional 
relationships was needed but it proved to be a skill driving a 
national vision which the current administration headed by 
the noble Lord Tu’ivakano fumbled, faltered, and flopped at. 
Epeli Hau’ofa’s starry-eyed allusion that an Oceania 
identity would one day unite Pacific Island states by a new 
form of regionalism shifting us away from Western colonial 
and economic domination has not happened (Hau’ofa, 2008, 
pp. 41-59).  It is merely political lip-service manoeuvred by 
government leaders to publicise token policies on blue and 
green economies painting over the dismal misfortune of 
struggling against climate change in all the colours of the 
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rainbow.  But still, Pacific Islander academics quote and re-
quote Hau’ofa’s nostalgia that “the sea is our most powerful 
metaphor” bonding Oceania states and peoples as if they 
believe chanting sentimentality like their mantra will in fact 
get politicians to take what they publish seriously and put it 
into practice.  This simply does not happen in the realpolitik of 
Pacific statehood. 
I know this is true.  I am an idealistic, well principled, left-
wing anthropologist who over references Hau’ofa’s writing 
because he was a Tongan born in diaspora who felt out-of-
place finding a fit in the homeland state (Hau’ofa, 2008, pp. 
97-109).  During his lifetime he remained an outsider at home.  
It equipped him with the social and intellectual liberty to 
speak back to power, unabashedly.  I can relate.  I write.  I am 
a critic.  Mainly because it is the one refined skill I have in my 
possession to pen my voice, have my say, and push my 
argument in public and up in your face, unapologetically. 
 
But above that level of everyday experience, the sea 
is out pathway to each other and to everyone else, the 
sea is our endless saga, the sea is our most powerful 
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Photograph by Bob Belcher on 22 May 2008 and reposted by Michael 
Field on the website, Michael Field: Reporter and Author – Pacific in 
2010: Beacon located on Teleki Tonga, south Minerva Reef, 
manned by His Majesty’s Armed Services of the Kingdom of Tonga. 
Photograph by Melino Maka, 2010: Lord Ma’afu. 
Photograph by Teena Brown Pulu, 4 April 2014: Seminati Pulu. 
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Endnotes 
 
1  Who’s who in the zoo is used here as a tongue-in-cheek reference.  
Tonga’s who’s who in the zoo points to the ruling elite; namely the 
royal family, the nobility, and the business elite.  The friendliness 
of certain business people with the traditional upper class is 
politically motivated.  Gaining a favourable economic position in 
the social hierarchy to exploit working class and underclass 
Tongans for profit is a driver of the middle class business sector.  
Tonga is, by all and sundry, a society structured by capitalist 
values where money, assets, and showing off wealth is revered as 
demonstrating a person’s material power and social status. 
Who’s who in the zoo is the Master of Philosophy thesis title of Richard 
Pamatatau, who descends from Mauke in the Cook Islands and is 
currently a journalism lecturer at Auckland University of 
Technology. 
 
2  The timeline on the Minerva Reefs’ political status cited below 
illustrates the ongoing tension between Fiji and Tonga as to 
whether the territory falls within their respective sovereign 
jurisdictions. 
 
See Cahoon, B. M. (2014). Tonga: Minerva. World Statesman 
Organization, Washington DC, United States of America, April 
20. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tonga.html 
 
I have amended Cahoon’s original script on the modern history of the 
Minerva Reefs for factual correctness and added in significant 
events and detail that were not recorded. 
 
9 September 1829  An Australian whaling ship Minerva wrecks 
on the south reef. 
 
1854 British Captain H. Denham of the HMS Herald chartered the 
two reefs, north and south, naming them the Minerva Reefs. 
 
1942 – 1945 United States of America military forces occupied 
the underwater atolls during the Pacific Campaign of World War 
II. 
 
6 July 1962 A Tongan twenty ton cutter measuring 51 feet in 
length called the Tuaikaepeau was shipwrecked on the Minerva 
Reefs with seven crew and ten passengers.  Four of the seventeen 
Tongans died on the south Minerva Reef before being rescued, 
Sione Lousi, Sione Sikimeti, Fatai Efiafi and Fetaiaki Pulu, and 
one drowned, Sateki Fifita.  In total, there were twelve survivors. 
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24 November 1966 The Minerva Reefs were annexed by 
Captain Tevita Fifita on behalf of the Kingdom of Tonga.  Tevita 
Fifita captained the Tuaikaepeau that was shipwrecked on the 
south Minerva Reef in 1962 and lost his son who was drowned, 
Sateki Fifita. 
 
1971 The Minerva Reefs were colonised by the Phoenix 
Foundation, a group of libertarians based in the United States of 
America. 
 
19 January 1972 The Republic of Minerva declaration made by the 
Phoenix Foundation is not legally or territorially recognised. 
 
24 February 1972 The Kingdom of Tonga restates its claim at the 
South Pacific Forum held in Suva, Fiji, from 12 – 14 September 
under the premiership of King Tafau’ahau Tupou IV. 
 
15 June 1972 The Minerva Reefs are formally defined as part of 
the Kingdom of Tonga by the royal proclamation of King 
Taufa’ahau Tupou IV which is recognised by the Republic of Fiji.  
In addition, Fiji had gained sovereign independence as a British 
colony in 1970. 
 
21 June 1972 The Minerva Reefs are occupied by the Kingdom of 
Tonga and named Teleki Tokelau for the north Minerva Reef, and 
Teleki Tonga for the south Minerva Reef. 
 
1982 For three weeks a group led by Morris C. Davis attempts to 
re-occupy the Minerva Reefs but is forced off by the Tongan 
military. 
 
November 2005  The Republic of Fiji lodges a complaint with the 
International Seabed Authority concerning their territorial claim 
over the Minerva Reefs and issue a statement not recognising 
maritime water claims over the disputed area by Tonga. 
